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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LEWIS BALLARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

I
\

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah )
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

12862

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Lewis Ballard, appeals from a decision
of the Third Judicial District Court denying his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Lewis Ballard filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, alleging that his commitment to the Utah
State P1ison was invalid. Said petition was supplemented
by a motion to vacate and set aside judgment, a motion
for change of judge, and a request that petitioner's appointed counsel be discharged. The matter was heard on
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February 24, 1972, before Judge Joseph G. Jeppson who
denied both motions, the request for discharge of counsel,
and the writ itself for lack of prosecution.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower court's
decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
?vfr. Ballard's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
heard on February 24, 1972. At the hearing, petitioner
submitted a motion for a change of judge (R. 17). The
motion, alleging no fact, recited only the following conclusion:
"The petitioner, while acting in good faith and
with sincerity do rsic l hereby declare that because
of bias and/or prejudice, he does not feel that he
can receive a fair hearing before the said Judge"
(R. 17).
Judge Jeppson denied the motion for failure to state sufficient facts to give rise to a conclusion in petitioner's
favor (R. 7, 8).
Petitioner's appointed counsel was present and prepared to proceed with the hearing (R. 38, 41, 43), yet
petitioner requested at the hearing that his counsel be
discharged (R. 38). This request was denied by Judge
Jeppson (R. 38), as was petitioner's request for a continuance (R. 43). Petitioner thereafter refused to proceed with or recognize the hearing (R. 43) , and the judge,
therefore, denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
for lack of prosecution (R. 43) .
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY RULED
ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF JUDGE, AND THUS POSSESSED JURISDICTION TO DENY THE WRIT 0 F
HABEAS CORPUS FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION.
Appellant filed his motion for change of judge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-25-6 (Supp. 1971), (Rule
63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is identical) which
provide::; in part as follows:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make
and file an affidavit that the judge before whom
such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
has a bias or prejudice, either against such party
or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in another judge to hear and determine the matter."
'fhe statute continues as follows:
"Every such affidavit shall state the facts and
the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable
after the case has been assigned or such bias or
prejudice is known ... no such affidavit shall be
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application
are made in good faith."
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Aside from the fact that appellant did not file an "affidavit" as required by the statute, but instead filed a "motion" which was not accompanied by an affidavit, the
appellant's motion was totally void of any facts and reasoning to support his allegations of bias or prejudice.
Furthennore, there was no accompanying certificate of
counsel that the "motion" (affidavit) and application
were made in good faith. Therefore, as the procedural
requirements of the statute and Rule were not properly
followed by appellant, Judge Jeppson denied the motion.
Appellant argues that Judge Jeppson was foreclosed
from ruling on the motion because of a further provision
of the Section 77-25-6, supra, which reads:
"If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit,
he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge (naming
him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit."

Respondent submits that appellant's interpretation of the
application of the above provision is overly broad and
erroneous. This provision was enacted to prevent a judge
who is accused of being biased or prejudiced from ruling
on the sufficiency of the facts and reasons alleged against
him in the affidavit, and, thus, he is relieved from the
delicate and trying duty of deciding the question of his
own disqualification. Such was not the case here since
appellant failed to state any facts and reasons to support
his allegations. No ruling could be made on the suffi-
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cicncy of the motion since without facts or reasons upon
which to base a decision. Instead, the lower court ruled
on the "procedurai" sufficiency of the motion (i.e.,
whether the basic statutory requirements of the affidavit
WC:18 adhered to.)
The right of the lower court to make
such a ruling is supported by this court's decision in
Christensen v. Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P. 2d 534
( H;S7) where the wife in a divorce action filed an affidavit of prejudice which simply alleged that the judge
"was personally acquainted with the plaintiff and had
; now1edge of her business transactions and her past personal life." The court held that the trial court did not
c1 ". when it chose not to transfer the case to a different
judg2 there were no "reasonable reasons" alleged in the
affidavit of the wife that would comply with the provision
of Rule 63 (b), supra, which requires that "every such
affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the belief
that such bias or prejudice exists." At least in the Christensen case, the complaining party attempted to assert
facts and reasons to support her affidavit even though
they were held to be "unreasonable." Mr. Ballard failed
to do even that. Thus, based on Christensen, supra,
Judge Jeppson was authorized, in the interest of judicial
time and efficiency, to rule on the procedural sufficiency
of appellant's motion without transferring it to another
judge.
It may further be noted that Utah's recusal statute
was taken from the Federal statute, 28 U. S. C. A. § 25
(now§ 144), which provides:
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"Whenever a party to any proceeding in a
district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice
either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
"The affidavit shall state the facts and the
reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists.... "
The United States Supreme Court in the leading case of
Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22 (1921), interpreted
the meaning of the above statute and adopted the same
view we have asserted concerning a judge's authority t-0
rule on the sufficiency of the affidavit. The Court held
that:

"A mere charge of bias and prejudice is a mere
exprec;;sion of an opinion. Bias or prejudice is a
state of mind which can be proved only by facts
and declarations from which it can be inferred.
The act therefore requires that the facts and the
reasons for the litigant's belief shall be stated.
Whether the judge is disqualified depend::;, then,
not upon the mere fact that prejudice has hew
charged, but upon the facts which it is alleged
tend to show such prejudice. Unless the facts so
alleged were intended to be considered and decided, by some authority, to have a tendency to
prove prejudice, the requirement that they should
be stated was an idle ceremony. Congress having
excluded every other judge from doing .so, the
judge against whom the charge is made must pass
upon the sufficiency of the affidavit before he retires from the case." Id. at 24.
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The Court not only afLT,1ed the judge's "right" to rule
on the sufficiency of the affidavit, but also declared that
"there i:; imposed upon the judge the duty of examining
the affidavit to determine whether or not it is the affidavit specified and required by the statute and to determine its legal sufficiency."
In conclusion, respondent submits that it is in the
best interest of the judicial system to permit a judge who
is accm;cd of bias and prejudice to rule on the procedural
sufficic1cy of the affidavit filed against him to insure
th3t such accusations are not frivolous, conclusionary or
lacLiEg factual support. Otherwise, the recusal or disqwdJicc. tion procedure might increasingly be abused by
untrustworthy litigants for the purposes of trial delay
or of obtaining favorable judges, or for other improper
motives. Since appellant listed no facts or reasons to
support his allegations of bias and prejudice, Judge Jeppson correctly dismissed the motion for change of judge
and, therefore, maintained jurisdiction to rule on appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR CHANGE
OF ATTORNEYS.
The right of a party to change his attorney is expressed in Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-34 (1953), as follows:
"The attorney in any action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before judgment or final determination, as follows:
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(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the
clerk or entered upon the minutes.
(2) Upon the order of the court or judge
thereof upon the application of the client, ai:2r
notice to the attorney."
The above Section is supplemented by Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-51-35 (1952), which provides:
"When an attorney is changed as provided
in [ § 78-51-34], written notice of the change and
of the substitution of a new attorney or of the appearance of the party in person must be given to
the adverse party; until then he must recognize
the former attorney."
Although most jurisdictions recognize that a client
has the right to make a change of attorneys at any stage
of the proceedings, either with or without cause, it is also
widely recognized that this right is not absolute since its
exercise may be denied where it will unduly prejudice the
other party 01' intei'fere with the administration of justice.
See 7 C. J. S. Attorney and Client § 119. The careful
wording of Section 78-51-34, supra, supports this limitation on the right by stating that the right to change attorneys must be accomplished "as follows." The statute
then lists the procedures which must be followed to insure fair and orderly administration of justice. The client
may receive a change of attorney if both he and his attorney consent to the change and such consent is either
filed with the clerk or entered upon the minutes. However, if the client and attorney do not consent, the change
may be effected only by an order of substitution obtained
on proper application to the court in which the proceed-
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ing is pending "afte:·"
uf the intended discharge
has been given to the original attorney. Section 78-51-35,
supra, further provides that the change of attorneys will
not be effective as to the adverse party until he has also
abo been notified thereof either by written notice or the
appearance of the party in person. Respondent submits
tint unless these minimal Code requirements are followed, the court can refuse to issue an order for change
of 9.ttorney. California takes this position in Davis v.
Rudolph, 80 Cal. 2d 397, 181 P. 2d 765 (1947). A review
of the record clearly shows that appellant has failed to
follow the aforementioned requirements.
Appellant's appointed counsel, Margaret Taylor, was
present and prepared to proceed with the habeas corpus
hearing when suddenly appellant, for the first time, informed the court, his own counsel, and the opposing party
that he wished to "fire this public defender from my case"
(R. 38). The record gives no indication that appellant
had previously notified anyone of his intent to discharge
his counsel and defend himself. Thus, his attorney had
no opportunity to disagree with or consent to her disqualification, and she clearly had no notice of the intended change. Appellant distorts the meaning of the
term "notice" by alleging that his sudden announcement
in court was sufficient notice to all concerned. The notice
requirement is elaborated upon in 7 C. J. S. Attorney and
Client, § 121 (1937), as follows:
" ... a party making application for an order
substituting an attorney must, ordinarily, give notice thereof to his attorney of record, although no
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special method of giving notice is required as long
as a reasorwble notice is given." (Emphasis
added.)
See also Schultheis v. Nash, 27 Wash. 250, 67 P. 707
(1902).
We submit that appellant's in-court declaration that
he was firing his attorney was far from "reasonable" and
should not be considered as adequate notice under Section 78-51-34, supra. Respondent further contends that
under the wording of Section 78-51-34, supra, appellant's
"application" to the court must be made "after notice to
the attorney."
Since no such notice was ever given, appellant's application to the court must fail as being premature. We,
therefore, conclude that the trial court committed no
error when it denied appellant's request for a change of
attorney.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that based on the foregoing, the
lower court properly ruled on appellant's motion for
change of judge, thus maintaining jurisdiction to deny
the writ of habeas corpus for lack of prosecution; and
also properly denied appellant's request for a change of
attorney.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
KENT LEWIS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

